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with	Russian	partners	defeated	 that	purpose.	Even	 though	 the	project	 is	
formally	a	Belarusian	investment,	Russia	has	in	fact	taken	over	full	control	
of	 its	 implementation	as	 it	 is	financing	 the	US$	 10	billion	project	 almost	
entirely.	Russia	is	the	project’s	contractor,	is	providing	the	technology	and	
will	also	provide	the	nuclear	fuel.	Given	Belarus	existing	financial,	trade,	






clear	 Power	 Plant	 (BNPP)	 in	 the	Kaliningrad	Oblast,	 and	 the	Astravyets	






















































•	 The	decision	 to	build	 the	nuclear	power	plant	 so	 close	 to	 the	Lithuanian	
border	has	 triggered	a	conflict	between	Vilnius	and	Minsk,	engendering	
a	deep	crisis	in	bilateral	relations.	While	the	Belarusian	side	is	still	inter-




















international	 safety	 standards.	The	 Lithuanians	 feel	 unsafe	 mainly	 be-
cause	the	Belarusian	side	does	not	have	full	control	over	the	–	effectively	
Russian	–	project,	and	factors	such	as	a	poor	working	culture	or	disregard	


















































































































I. Nuclear eNergy IN the eNergy polIcy of Belarus
The	Belarusian	SSR	was	affected	by	the	1986	Chernobyl	nuclear	disaster	more	
than	any	other	former	Soviet	republic.	A	large	part	of	the	country’s	territory	



















































plant	will	 generate,	 in	 the	 domestic	market.	Hence	 the	 considerable	 uptick	
in	domestic	consumption	envisaged	in	the	Belarusian	leadership’s	strategy.
table 1. Expected changes in the electricity generation and energy mix of 
Belarus in the years 2015–2035 (TWh)
2015 2020 2025 2030 2035
Annual energy production 
34.4 39.9 41.6 42.1 43.8
CHP plants (mostly gas-fired) 34.2 31.8 21.8 22 23.2
Renewables 0.27 0.95 1.8 2.1 2.6
Nuclear -------- 7.1 18 18 18
Annual energy consumption 37.3 39.9 41.6 42.1 43.8
Electricity imports 2.82 0 0 0 0
Share of the dominant fuel 
(i.e. natural gas in electricity 
































































II. coNstructIoN of the BelarusIaN Nuclear power 
plaNt






















8	 The	protest	 against	 the	nuclear	power	plant	has	 for	many	years	been	an	 important	part	
of	the	rhetoric	of	the	Belarusian	opposition	and	environmental	groups.	The	topic	returns	





































Belarus’s energy and economic dependence on russia
Since regaining independence in 1991, Belarus has depended on co-oper-
ation with Russia – its sole provider of energy resources, its main market 
and main lender. Russia covers 100% of Belarus’s gas needs, and the Rus-
sian gas company Gazprom has been the sole owner of the Belarusian gas 
pipeline network and the Yamal transit gas pipeline since 2011. As much 
as 90% of electricity in Belarus is produced from gas. While power genera-
tion could use other energy resources, the Belarusian nitrate and potas-
sium plants would not be able to cut their consumption of imported gas, 
which is necessary in their production processes. Similarly, 90% of the oil 
in Belarus comes from Russia. Belarus extracts around 1.6 million tonnes 
of oil annually from its own deposits, but all that output is exported, mostly 
to Germany. Thus, the country’s two refineries (in Navapolatsk and Ma-
zyr) are completely dependent on oil imports from Russia (18 to 24 million 
tonnes of oil a year). Still in 2015, as much as a quarter of Belarus’s export 
revenues came from the sale of petroleum products. For this reason, Rus-
sian supplies of energy resources are a crucial factor not only for the func-
tioning of a large part of Belarusian industry, but also its profitability. The 
dependence on Russia is further deepened by the Belarusian economy’s 
heavy orientation towards the Russian market. According to Belarusian 
statistics, trade with Russia accounted for 40–50% of Belarusian exports 
and more than 50% of imports in the last dozen or so years. In the case of 
the agricultural and food sector, as much as 90% of its produce is sold in the 
Russian market. Belarus’s reliance on co-operation with Russia is further 
reinforced by the credit extended by Russia directly from the state budget 













Fund for Stabilisation and Development. In that situation, it was an abso-
lute priority for Minsk to obtain preferential terms and conditions from 
Moscow; one of the results of this in practice was the negotiation of the 
lowest possible oil and gas prices. In this context, in the mid-1990s, after 
Alyaksandr Lukashenka came to power, Belarus decided to build a union 
state with Russia. It was the first re-integration project in the post-Soviet 
area. Since then Minsk has taken part in all Russian integration initiatives, 
including the Eurasian Economic Union launched in 2015. The two coun-
tries also co-operate closely in the areas of defence and security. Minsk’s 
loyalty to Moscow is the price for it pays for at least some of the Russian 
subsidies, which totalled around US$ 100 billion between 2005 and 2015 ac-
cording to the International Monetary Fund’s calculations (including of-
ficial aid such as loans and hidden subsidies in the form of lower prices on 
imported resources). Despite frequent tension and periodic disagreements, 
close co-operation with Russia remains the most important priority of Be-



















и	 радиационной	 безопасности	 Министерства	 по	 чрезвычайным	 ситуациям	
Республики	Беларусь,	 13.07.2012,	http://www.gosatomnadzor.gov.by/index.php/ru/bez-
opasnost-belorusskoj-aes/obshchaya-informatsiya-o-stroitelstve-belorusskoj-aes











































13	 РФ выделит Белоруссии $10 млрд на строительство АЭС,	 3.10.2014,	 http://www.vestifi-
nance.ru/articles/47777	
14	 Белорусская АЭС: чья это будет собственность?,	 17.03.2014,	http://nmnby.eu/news/ana-
lytics/5441.html	




















































18	 Information	 provided	 by	Mikhail	 Filimonov,	 director	 general	 of	 the	 Astravyets	 nuclear	
power	plant,	during	a	press	conference	in	October	2017,	Строительство Белорусской АЭС 

























































































structure,	while	 the	 other	 (SEED)	 looked	 at	 the	 project	 itself,	with	 particular	 emphasis	
on	the	external	impact,	Беларусь продолжит практику тесного взаимодействия с	МАГАТЭ 
– МИД,	7.03.2017,	https://www.interfax.by/news/belarus/1221116	
23	 Press	conference	of	Nikolai	Grusha,	director	of	the	Nuclear	Energy	Department	at	the	Bela-



















III. the astravyets plaNt aNd russIa’s strategy 


























Bangladesh Ruppur 2 US$ 11.38 billion loan 2022–2023
Belarus Astravyets 2 US$ 10 billion  loan 2018–2020





egypt Al-Dabbah 4 US$ 25 billion loan 2026–
2029






(units 3 and 4)
US$ 3.5 billion loan 2020s
Iran Bushehr 2 2
































hungary Paks 2 US$ 10 billion loan 2020s












the Baltic Nuclear power plant in the Kaliningrad oblast 
The planned Baltic Nuclear Power Plant (BNPP) in the Kaliningrad Oblast 
(close to the city of Neman near the Lithuanian border) is an example of 
a project that was intended to enable Russia to export electricity to Euro-
pean markets. The decision to build two units with a total capacity of 2,300 
MW was taken in 2009. In view of the Kaliningrad Oblast’s very limited 
electricity needs, the real aim of the project was to export electricity to 
countries in the region (mainly Poland and Lithuania, but also Germany). 
The Russian side made the first proposals to build electricity interconnec-
tors between the Kaliningrad Oblast and Poland back in May 2010. They 
concerned the construction of a double circuit 400 kV high-voltage power 
line. In the following years Russia proposed to build modified variants of 
the interconnectors: as a direct link between the Kaliningrad Oblast and 
Poland (Mamonovo – Olsztyn), a link using existing Russian-Lithuanian in-
frastructure (Sovetsk – Bitėnai – Klaipeda), and finally a Polish-Lithuanian 













laying a submarine electricity cable from the Kaliningrad Oblast to Ger-
many. As the potential electricity buyers showed no interest, and because 
Russia struggled to find interested external investors to fund the Baltic Nu-
clear Power Plant, the project was suspended in June 2013. 
Discussions about a nuclear power plant in the Kaliningrad Oblast recom-
menced in 2017, but their outcome so far suggests that the debate mainly 
serves propaganda purposes. On the one hand, the Russian energy minis-
ter Alexander Novak said during a visit to Kaliningrad in April 2017 that 
implementing the project is necessary in view of the projections of rising 
electricity consumption in Europe. At the same time, Rosatom representa-
tives started to intensively promote the project during open seminars and 
industry conferences, emphasising that it would generate electricity for 
export (mainly to the Central European markets), while the media start-
ed spreading reports that the reactor pressure vessel damaged during at-
tempted assembly in Astravyets would be moved to Kaliningrad and used 
on the Baltic Nuclear Power Plant. However, no steps have been taken that 
would indicate that works on the project are genuinely recommencing. 
Moreover, in view of the energy strategies of EU member states and the 
projections of electricity generation and consumption, the EU will not need 
to import electricity. On top of that, as many Western European countries 
are abandoning nuclear energy (especially Germany), the prospect of them 
importing electricity generated at nuclear power plant in the Kaliningrad 
Oblast or Astravyets does not seem realistic. 
Irrespective of the freezing of the BNPP project, Moscow has proceeded 
to expand the electricity and energy infrastructure in the Kaliningrad 
Oblast. On 2 March 2018, two large gas-fired power plants were officially 
commissioned (Mayakovskaya and Talakhovskaya, with a capacity of 156 
MW each), and two more are under construction, including the gas-fired 
Pregolskaya (with a capacity of 440 MW, planned launch in late 2018 or ear-
ly 2019) and the coal-fired Primorskaya (with a capacity of 195 MW, planned 
launch in the first half of 2020). The cost of building the four facilities is es-
timated at RUB 100 billion. The total capacity of power plants currently op-
erating in the Kaliningrad Oblast is 900 MW (2 units of the Kaliningrads-
kaya–2 CHP plant). The future demand for power capacity in the oblast will 
range, according to Russian estimations, from 250 to 840 MW, and Moscow 
argues that the expansion of capacity by around 950 MW is justified by the 
projected increase in electricity consumption in the Kaliningrad Oblast by 













intended to provide security in the event the existing power plants need to 







table 3. Russian electricity exports by country (TWh)
2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
finland 3.79 4.10 2.99 3.38 5.28 5.04
lithuania 4.78 3.56 3.21 2.99 3.01 3.13
china 2.63 3.49 3.37 3.29 3.32 3.32
georgia 0.51 0.46 0.62 0.51 0.40 0.50
Kazakhstan 2.28 1.66 1.64 1.54 1.16 1.29
Belarus 3.69 3.59 1.42 2.81 3.18 2.73
Mongolia 0.39 0.41 0.39 0.28 0.30 0.37
south ossetia 0.13 0.13 0.14 0.14 0.15 0.15
ukraine 0.08 0.03 0.17 2.46 0.12 0.09
azerbaijan 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.06




















































Iv. lIthuaNIa oN the BelarusIaN Nuclear power 
plaNt IN astravyets













recommendation	of	 the	 International	Atomic	Energy	Agency	 (IAEA)	has	











•	 Because of the project’s location, the Lithuanian government has been 
forced to take measures to address the effects of a possible incident.	
The	cost	of	developing	countermeasures	in	the	event	of	radioactive	contam-
ination	will	be	borne	by	the	Lithuanian	side.	Lithuania	has	been	forced	to	

























•	 Constantly monitoring the situation in Astravyets will pose a chal-
lenge to the Lithuanian services.	Minsk	habitually	reports	incidents	(for	
now,	related	only	to	construction	works)	solely	under	pressure	from	the	in-
dependent	media	in	Belarus	and	from	Lithuania.	Vilnius	is	not	concerned	
by	the	reactor	technology	but	considers	itself	to	be under major risk due 
to	 an	 inadequate working culture, a disregard for safety standards 
and poor supervision of the plant’s construction. In	the	opinion	of	the	
Lithuanian	 authorities,	 Belarus	 is	 not	 performing	 sufficient	 oversight	





of	 the	 plant’s	 safety	 arrangement	 (the	 first	 reactor	 pressure	 vessel	 was	
dropped	 to	 the	ground	on	10	 July	2016,	and	 the	second	one	collided	with	
a	railway	pylon	on	26	December	2016	and,	despite	the	damage	sustained,	
was	approved	for	installation	at	the	first	unit).
•	 No stress tests have been carried out despite Lithuania’s demands.	
Lithuania	has	been	calling	for	such	tests	to	be	carried	out	with	the	partici-




•	 Belarus has been manipulating the SEED (Site and External Events 




























Moreover,	Belarus	has	not	 studied	 the	plant	 structure’s	 resilience	 in	 the	














28	 Lithuania	 invokes	 the	 example	 of	 Finland	which	 demonstrated	 that	 the	 structure	 of	 its	
Rosatom-designed	plant	on	the	Hanhikivi	peninsula	could	not	withstand	an	aircraft	impact,	
and	the	Russian	company	was	forced	to	modify	the	designs.















































31	 Declassified	 documents	 of	 the	 Lithuanian	 security	 service	 VSD	 (State	 Security	 Depart-
ment)	show	that	in	2012	Rosatom	tried	to	increase	its	sway	in	Lithuania	by	building	rela-
tions	with	Lithuanian	entrepreneurs,	via	whom	the	Russian	side	also	 tried	 to	bribe	pol-
iticians	of	 the	 then	ruling	Social	Democratic	Party.	Former	KGB	operatives	 in	Lithuania	
















































never	be	friends	with	anyone	against	Russia;	VSD medžiaga: “Rosatom” per M. Bastį bandė 



















the Baltic grids – towards synchronisation with continental europe
When the Baltic states joined the EU, their energy systems were isolated 
from the European energy system. In 2004 the development of intercon-
nectors started, and currently the Baltic region can exchange energy with 
the EU system via four asynchronous interconnections linking Estonia and 
Finland (Estlink 1, Estlink 2), Lithuania and Sweden (NordBalt), and Lithu-
ania and Poland (LitPol Link). The links to Finland and Sweden connect 
the Baltic grids with the Nordel grid (comprised of the Nordic states), while 
the link to Poland connects the Baltic grids to the UCTE grid (spanning 
continental Europe). Grid operators in the UCTE and Nordel systems work 
together under the ENTSO-E agreement which brings together European 
transmission system operators who together make up the EU energy mar-
ket. Despite the development of interconnections, the Baltic grids are still 
part of the post-Soviet IPS/UPS synchronous system (under the BRELL 
agreement on co-operation between the operators in Belarus, Russia, Es-
tonia, Latvia and Lithuania). Currently the three Baltic states intend to de-
synchronise from the IPS/UPS and synchronise with the continental Eu-






























where is lithuania’s electricity produced? 
Since the Ignalina NPP was phased out on 31 December 2009, the Elektrėnai 
power plant (with a reserve capacity unit and a new combined cycle unit 
operating on gas/mazut), the pumped-storage plant in Kruonis and the Al-
girdas Brazauskas hydro power plant in Kaunas have been the country’s 
main power generators. All three are owned by the state-owned company 
Lietuvos Energijos Gamyba which generates and trades in electricity, sell-
ing it in the Nord Pool Spot exchange and providing balancing services to 
energy suppliers. There are also other, smaller power plants that use local 
and renewable sources (mainly CHP plants running on biomass and wind 
farms). The Lithuanian power plants are able to fully cover the country’s 
electricity demand, but they use only around 22% of their installed capac-
ity because the price of electricity generated in Lithuania is not competitive 
due to the need to import fuels (gas and mazut). Because of that, Lithuania 
imports energy, mainly from Estonia, Latvia, the Nordic states, Poland, 
Russia and Belarus. Before 2016, around 50% of imported electricity on av-
erage came from Estonia and the Nordic states, and another 50% from Rus-
sia (with around 2% coming from Belarus). When the NordBalt and LitPol 
Link interconnections were launched in early 2016, the structure of energy 
imports changed. The interconnections allowed Lithuania to better diver-
sify its imports and reduced its dependence on providers outside the EU, es-
pecially Russia. In 2016, imports from Latvia, Estonia, Sweden and Poland 
accounted for 70% of Lithuania’s total electricity imports. The remaining 
30% came from Russia and Belarus. 

























































35	 On	 17	March	2017,	Piotr	Naimski,	 the	Polish	minister	and	governmental	plenipotentiary	
for	strategic	energy	infrastructure,	announced	that	Poland	would	not	buy	electricity	from	


































may	be	 seen	as	 a	way	 for	Lithuania	 to	 exert	 additional	 economic	pressure	
on	Belarus.	





































Vilnius	has	represented Astravyets as a purely political project inspired 
by Russia, which Belarus has limited control of, forcing Lithuania to more 
broadly consider various safety aspects of the project. Lithuania demon-
strates that while the HVVER-1200 reactor technology is not controver-
sial, Rosatom has not complied with safety standards while implementing 
















preparing	 for	 desynchronisation	 already	 since	 2014.	 Information	 obtained	
38	 On	 22	March	 2018,	 the	 prime	ministers	 of	 Poland,	 Latvia	 and	 Estonia	 and	 the	 president	
of	Lithuania	reached	agreement,	 in	the	presence	of	European	Commission	President	 Jean-
Claude	Juncker,	on	synchronising	their	electricity	grids	with	continental	Europe	via	Poland.	















































































the	 announcements	 regarding	 the	 Russian	 and	 Belarusian	 nuclear	 projects	 as	 attempts	
at	pressuring	investors	in	order	to	undermine	the	Visaginas	project	by	implying	it	would	
face	 too	 much	 competition	 in	 the	 regional	 electricity	 generation	 market.	The	 pressure	






































































































48	 Беларусь впервые отказалась от закупки электроэнергии,	 21.02.2018,	http://naviny.by/
new/20180221/1519235858-belarus-vpervye-otkazalas-ot-zakupki-elektroenergii
49	 This	means	capacity	that	ensures	adequate	generation	levels	at	times	of	peak	energy	con-
sumption.	 In	 some	 cases,	 separate	 power	 plants	 are	 built	 to	 back	 up	 the	 nuclear	 power	
plant.
50	 It	is	the	newest	CHP	plant	in	Belarus	whose	construction	was	completed	in	2012,	Пиково-
резервный источник планируется ввести на ТЭЦ-5 в Пуховичском районе,	 25.04.2017,	
http://atom.belta.by/ru/news_ru/view/pik-rezervnogo-istochnika-planiruetsja-vvesti-
na-tets-5-v-puxovichskom-rajone-9262	







































As	 regards	 reserve	 capacity,	 in	September	2016	 the	Belarusian	 side	 signed	
an	agreement	with	Germany’s	Siemens.	From	the	point	of	view	of	the	energy	
52	 See:	Концепции, программы и комплексные планы, Министерство	энергетики	Республики	
Беларусь,	http://minenergo.gov.by/zakonodatelstvo/koncepcii_i_proframmi	
53	 http://www.belmarket.by/ekonomicheskoe-napryazhenie-aes;	 О ходе реконструкции 
Гомельской ТЭЦ-2 с установкой электрических котлов,	 Министерство	 энергетики	
Республики	Беларусь,	11.08.2016,	http://minenergo.gov.by/o-hode-rekonstruktsii-gomel-
skoj-te-ts-2-s-ustanovkoj-e-lektricheskih-kotlov	
54	 А.	Шрайбман,	Куда мы денем энергию с АЭС? Мифы и реальность,	4.09.2017,	https://news.
tut.by/economics/558443.html	
55	 Cryptocurrency	operations	(including	mining)	were	legalised	in	Belarus	under	the	presi-
dential	 decree	 “On	 the	 development	 of	 the	 digital	 economy”	 which	 entered	 into	 force	















































57	 Белорусская земля «не принимает» ЛЭП Островецкой АЭС,	14.06.2016,	http://ex-press.by/
article.php?id=118246

















































of	 the	 Leningradskaya	Nuclear	 Power	 Plant	 in	 particular	 (initially	 the	 1.2	GW	unit	was	





















lithuanian estimates concerning the price of energy generated at the 
Belarusian Npp
Arvydas Galinis, the head of the Complex Energy Studies lab at the Lithu-
anian Energy Institute in Kaunas, has compares the projected price of elec-
tricity from Astravyets with prices in the Nordic-Baltic region. In his view, 
in order for the construction of a nuclear power plant to be economically 
justified, the price of energy needs to be sufficient in view of the cost borne 
by the investors. Currently the average global market price of 1 kWh is 8.5 
eurocents. In the Lithuanian trading zone at the Nord Pool Spot exchange 
the price is lower, at around 3.5–4 eurocents per 1 kWh. The average price 
for the Nordic states at the Nord Pool Spot exchange in 2017 was around 3.2 
eurocents per 1 kWh. The price of electricity generated in Belarus from gas 
is currently 4-5 eurocents per 1 kWh. According to the Belarusian energy 
minister Uladzimir Patupchyk, the launch of the Astravyets plant will en-
able Belarus to reduce that price by 15%. The installed capacity of Astra-
vyets can produce 16.4 TWh a year. Even if all of that power was sold at 
current prices in Belarus, the annual revenues of the plant would reach 
around EUR 660 million, which means that the Russian loan would not be 
repaid within 15 years from the plant’s revenues alone. Optimistic and pes-
simistic simulations were conducted by Galinis while taking into account 
various parameters; they show that the cost of producing electricity ranges 
between 3.8 eurocents per 1 kWh (in the optimist variant) to 9.3 eurocents 
per 1 kWh (in the pessimistic model).62
61	 Потребление	электроэнергии	в	ЕЭС	России	в	2017	году	увеличилось	на	1,3%,	10.01.2018,	
https://www.eprussia.ru/news/base/2018/5600395.htm
62	 E.	Naprys,	Viskas, ką žinome apie Astrave kylantį monstrą: ekonominio pagrįstumo nėra – tik 




























to	finance	 them.	 Statements	 by	Belarusian	 officials,	 including	Alyaksandr	
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110–750 kV transmission lines
planned existing
under construction decommissioning
